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INTRODUCTION 
 
Stock is one of the financial instruments in 
many countries including Indonesia. By 
cutting-edge of technology especially in the 
industrial revolution 4.0 era, Indonesian stock 
not only can be owned by the domestic 
investors but also the foreign investors. Some 
people believe that foreign investors can 
provide some benefits i.e. their control, 
transparency, technology transfer, risk 
sharing, and good corporate governance to a 
company based on the corporate governance 
theory (Shleifer and Vishmy, 1997; Becht et 
al. 2003).  
On the contrary, some other researchers 
argue that they give loss or negative 
contributions to the stock, because the stock 
owned by the foreign not inevitably lower risk, 
nevertheless the risk can be higher. The 
foreign ownership has a negative impact to 
the performance and risk which can be 
explained by the agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckeling, 1976), whereas there is a 
possible conflict between foreign and 
domestic investor that can make an 
inefficiency, especially the conflict of interest 
between foreign and domestic owners who 
have different preference on the risk.On one 
side, the foreign might be the risk taker, while 
on another side, the domestic owners are 
risk-averse. That different preference toward 
the risk would lead the conflict among those 
investors. That conflict would provide to the 
poor stock performance. In another hand, 
some found that there is no interaction 
between foreign ownership to the stock’s 
performance and risk (Bekaert and Harvey, 
1997; De Santis and Imrohoroglu, 1994; Kim 
and Singal, 2000).      
The main ideas of this research consist of 
two points: 1) how the relationship of foreign 
ownership to the performance and risk of the 
stock. Whether by the stock is owned by the 
foreign investor, the performance and risk 
could be better or worse. 2). The better 
performance of stock may attract foreign 
investor to enter. These conditions would 
make the foreign investor attaining gain/profit. 
The lower risk may also become interesting 
for the foreigners, whereas it can provide a 
safe investment opportunity for them. The 
higher the risk the higher the return. We 
would explore more which one the earlier 
influence, those reasons above provide both 
foreign to risk-performance and risk-
performance to foreign could be influenced 
by each other.
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This phenomenon also can be explained 
by the other theories like ownership structure 
foreign subsidiaries (Gomes, 1989), 
transaction cost (Williamson, 1981), 
institutional (Di Magio and Powell, 1983), and 
agency theory (Jensen and Mckeling, 1976), 
but we choose to focus on the agency theory. 
According to Jensen and Mckeling (1976), an 
agency conflict can occur between the 
manager and the owner, also between the 
majority and minority shareholders. That 
conflict also can be happened due to the 
separation between the company’s ownership 
and control. In addition, Kurniawati and 
Komalasari (2014) suggested that conflict also 
exists between state ownership and foreign 
ownership, the Indonesian government as 
state representative who is risk averse, while 
the foreign owner is risk taker both individual 
and institutional because they have ability, 
knowledge, and developed technology to 
make the company more enlarging by 
expansion. Foreign ownership is defined by 
entirelyor majority owned the business or 
resource in the country by an individual or 
company who is not the citizen of that country. 
It happened from multinational activity, long-
term investment (foreign direct investment), 
and subsidiary. 
In Indonesia, the government has ever 
limited the foreign investors in some sector 
like a plantation to protect the small local 
plantation company until 30%. In another 
country like Qatar also has limitation to foreign 
ownership is from 49% to be strictly 25%, it 
helps to select the only long-term investor 
who may enter. Lastly, Russia limits it by no 
more than 25%.  
Those attract us to explore deeply the 
literature on how the relationship between 
foreign ownership and risk-performance is. 
Whether that relationship is only one direction 
or it can be two way from the agency theory 
view. Much literature has conducted on the 
relationship between foreign ownership and 
performance, and foreign direct investment 
(FDI), but in the two-way relationship, e.g. 
performance-risk to foreign ownership is quite 
limited. Based on those problem 
backgrounds, we attempt to examine whether 
foreign ownership influences performance and 
risk. We also test whether stock performance 
and risk influences foreign ownership. 
 
 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
Since 2000s, there has been an increase in 
foreign investors in many developing 
countries as a result of financial liberalization 
and globalization. The disappearing of 
investment limit among countries makes it 
easy to do. In many developing countries, 
international investment becomes the source 
of economic growth (Vo, 2015).  
According to Phung and Mishra (2015), the 
percentage of foreign ownership is the 
percentage of the stock owned by foreign both 
individual or institutional. The goal of the stock 
owner is commonly to maximize their wealth, 
nevertheless by the time their purpose can be 
different: 1) to improve job opportunity 
(society) 2) To prevent the penetration of 
foreign investors and protect domestic 
investors (politic) (Phung and Misrha, 2015). 
According to Elliot and Zhou (2015), 
foreign investors may play an important role 
inthe stockmarket of developing countries. 
Jiang and Kim (2004), one of its roles is their 
better ability to process the provided 
information from the public than domestic 
investors. Some other studies (De Santis and 
Imrohoroglu, 1994; Bekaert and Harvey, 
1997; and Kim and Singal, 2000) depict that 
the market openness to foreign investors 
leads to the proper stability and lower 
volatility.  Grinbalt and Keloharju (2000) 
added foreign investors, tended to buy winner 
stocks and sell loser shares. Foreign investors 
tended to invest in shares which are well 
performed. Hence, they prefer to choose a 
large company with a higher export ratio 
(Merton, 1987). 
Nonetheless, they also will face some risk 
to buy or invest stock from the foreign capital 
market in other countries like currency, market 
fluctuations, some situations (politic, 
economic, social, liquidity, limited information, 
law, and market operational (Shapiro, 2006; 
Azar, 2010). Agarwall et al. (2009) stated that 
foreign investors are risk-averse than 
domestic. Kwon et al. (2005) may access 
different information and risk than domestic. 
Phung and Mishra (2015), the policymakers 
necessarily need to encourage foreign 
ownership. Nevertheless, they must spread it 
inthe broader company,this can be beneficial 
for increasing the company performance but 
avoiding its negative impact. 
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Agency theory, foreign ownership, and 
performance-risk 
 
The view of the agency theory could explain 
the relationship between foreign ownership 
and the performance-risk (Jensen and 
Mckeling, 1976). The notion is a possible 
conflict between the principal (the manager) 
with an agent (the foreign stock owner) due to 
the conflict of interests. On one side, the 
manager wants company management far 
from the risk. Nevertheless, the foreign 
investors as the stock owner pursuehigh-risk 
investment to obtain a high return. The owner 
controlled the manager act. Then, the foreign 
owner also has the voting right in the 
corporate decision making (corporate action). 
That conflict leads the business becoming 
inefficient if the conflict is low the company 
performance would be high and the risk would 
be low. In contrast, if the agency problem is 
high, the company performance would be 
worse, and the risk would be significant.    
Meanwhile, the presence of good 
corporate governance could solve that 
conflict, it could make the manager act 
following the company’s goal and the foreign 
owner does not expropriate his position to 
affect the company’s decision by his interest. 
The foreign investors should play a critical 
role in an improvement of the company 
performance, e.g. risk sharing, technology 
transfer, additional capital, transparency, 
accountability, good control, and the direction 
of the betterdecision-making process. 
According to Shleifer and Vishmy (1986) 
related to the agency theory Jensen and 
Mckeling (1976), the ownership structure quite 
influenced its risk-taking, only the controlling 
shareholders who have the power to affect the 
corporate decision to maximize the profit by 
taking the risk, it is equal with a diversification. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) added the 
combination of ownership and control could 
help the concentrated shareholder to change 
the profit with the private rents. Galais and 
Masulis (1976) stated the first source conflict 
between manager and stockholder comes 
from their different perception about the risk, 
the shareholders with diversified risk tend to 
be a risk taker with the expectation to obtain a 
higher return, nevertheless the manager tends 
to be risk-averse to save his position and the 
personal benefit. Fuentelsaz et al. (2000) 
added, uncertainty is one of the fundamental 
variables in the agency theory, the risk would 
increase if the principal and agent have a 
different attitude toward the risk. At least, one 
party would be risk-averse, the common 
assumption is that the principal is neutral and 
the agent is risk averse. 
The decision of shareholders can be 
positive and negative toward the risk, 
sometimes they like to take the risk to attain 
higher profit, and in other times they also can 
be risk-averse to invest safely. Ross et al. 
noted that if the percentage of ownership is 
high (majority), the majority shareholders can 
determine the corporate structure of whoever 
can have a particular position in the company. 
It makes themajority of shareholders having 
control of the company. Furthermore, 
Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) and 
Mintzberg (1983) about the ownership 
dimension regarding the corporate decision, 
the shareholders can be involved 
(involvement) and uninvolved (detachment). 
The higher involved the owners, and the more 
concentrated the ownership, the larger the 
power they should have in influencing the 
corporation (Chaganti and Damanpour, 1991 
p.3).  
In the agency theory view, the 
concentrated ownership would increase the 
shareholders to monitor the company 
management, avoid the decision that benefits 
personally one party and negatively to the 
company performance. Nonetheless, this 
argument is right in the law which protects the 
minority shareholders, if the law is weak or not 
exists, the company control by the majority 
shareholders would happen, and it will bring 
negative impact to the corporation. Albeit, in 
theory, the separation of ownership and 
control can be done to provide benefit to the 
company, but in reality, it is difficult to realize. 
Not only foreign ownership is hypothesized 
influencing the performance, but the 
performance may also influence the foreign 
investor to enter, the literature commonly 
focused on the foreign direct investment 
(FDI), little literature discussed the foreign 
ownership. The both are different, ownership 
means owning the shares, however, FDI more 
than that, it is like entirely build and invest in 
the company in the foreign countries. Then, 
the joint venture is one part of FDIs. 
In Indonesia, the second conflict that may 
appear is the conflict between the Indonesian 
government and foreign ownership. Both may 
have a different purpose to the company, and 
the conflict of interest may occur. The 
government may limit the ownership stock by 
the foreign because the also bring the global 
risk and to protect the domestic investor, while 
the foreign investor may desire to own the 
Diponegoro International Journal of Business, Vol.1, No.2, 2018, pp. 71-85 
 
74 
 
stock without restriction. If the foreign 
investors own the stock, they may play in the 
company decision making. Indonesian 
company particularly the state-company 
(Badan Usaha Milik Negara), insurance, and 
plantation now commonly restricted foreign 
ownership. If the financial system and 
regulation in a country well-supports the 
foreign to enter, it will attract the foreign 
investor. However, in this globalization era, 
foreign investors are demanding to limit 
because the countries need additional capital. 
At least the government can keep the majority 
holding (minimum the government owns 51% 
percent).   
Besides the agency theory can explain 
foreign ownership phenomenon, other 
theories of the firm may also explain it like 
transaction cost theory, Hennart (1988) said 
that every organization would choose the 
governance structure which can minimize the 
total transaction cost, including contract cost, 
performance monitoring, and monitoring the 
partner behavior. In this theory, entering 
foreign ownership may add and or reduce 
those costs. Then, the efficient market 
hypothesis by Fama (1970), the theory 
implied that the market wouldrespond with 
some new relevant information, whether 
foreign ownership is relevant or not.  
Furthermore, the further is the prospect 
theory; it explains that the economic decision 
is a considered choice between benefit and 
the risk, rather than the result. The loss (risk) 
has a more significant role than the benefit. In 
this topic, the risk may make the foreign 
investors avoid it, while the company 
performance would attract them to enter. 
More than that, Phung and Mishra (2015) 
used multi-perspective theory to explain the 
foreign ownership phenomenon (agency, 
resource-based, and institutional) to 1,005 
companies in India between 1999-2000, they 
found that the foreign ownership has the 
positive effect toward the risk due to involving 
in the monitoring and governance of company 
internal. Next, institutional theory from Oliver 
(1992) in Olcott (2009), some Japanese 
companies have been taken over by foreign 
owners, where the routine activity of 
organization and the foundation value can be 
delegitimized by them (deinstitutionalization). 
Barney (1991) explained the resource-based 
view, in this view the foreign ownership may 
become the source of competitive advantage 
that the other companies do not have.  
 
 
Based on some existing literature, we attempt 
to summarize it for formulating some 
hypothesizes which hopefully could answer 
the research matters. Firstly, despite the 
relationship of the foreign ownership to the 
performance is contradictive, we choose to 
hypothesize that the foreign contributes 
positively to the performance. Study byPhung 
and Mishra (2015), foreign ownership can 
increase the performance of stock due to the 
fact the foreign investors could give the 
excellent control and improve the 
management system, increase the 
transparency, resource access, technology 
transfer, risk sharing, learning, productivity, 
efficiency, and stabilization (Vo, 2015), good 
corporate governance (Stulz, 1999; Doidge et 
al. 2004; Becht et al. 2003). It follows the 
corporate governance from Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997), where is the good governance, 
there will occur the company improvement, 
stimulating the financial industry due to 
enhancing the network to the capital flow. 
Jiang and Kim (2004) added the foreign 
owners have a better ability to process 
relevant information which is available from 
the public.  
They can enlarge the governance and the 
quality of opening company investment 
information (Vo, 2015; Fan and Wong, 2002; 
Jin and Myers, 2006). De Santis and 
Imrohoroglu (1994) said the market openness 
to the foreign investor tends to be more stable 
and lower volatility. Vein and Melitz (2003) in 
Ricci and Trionfetti (2012), the new trade 
theory views that the importance of network to 
open new market (international trade) 
positively associates with the foreign network 
to increase the financial link that would make 
the company more productive in the future. 
The foreign ownership enhances the 
supervision (Fuentelsaz, 2000), monitoring, 
Liu and Hsu, 2001), knowledge (Peter et al. 
2016), liquidity and professional employee, 
and decrease the agency cost, increase 
additional capital, return, and long-term 
commitment (Utama and Musa, 2011). 
Overall, we believe that foreign can increase 
performance. Therefore, we take two way 
hypothesizes as follows:  
 
H1: Foreign ownership positively affects  
performance of stock in Indonesia 
 
In the second hypothesis, despite the 
impact of foreign ownership on the risk is 
debatable. We believe that foreign 
shareholders to decrease the risk of stock in 
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Indonesia. The foreign ownership plays an 
important role in the risk sharing (Pambudi 
and Smyth, 2009; Li et al. 2011) toward the 
owned stocks so that the risk would be lower 
(Becht et al. 2003). Entering the foreign 
investors would contribute to the stock and 
decrease the risk because the owner can 
curtail the risk. The owner could tolerate the 
risk by the preference, taking the correct 
decision and optimal capital structure (Ang, 
2000). Aebi et al. (2012)found any excellent 
governance and chief risk officer to reduce the 
risk which is reflected in the higher ROE and 
return. Wang (2007) proved that foreign 
ownership alleviates to the company’s loss. It 
suggested that, in our research, the larger 
stock owned by the foreign investors, the 
lower risk of stock in Indonesia.Kurniawati and 
Komalasari (2014), if there is less conflict 
between the majority and minority 
shareholders, then the risk of stock would be 
lower. The separation of control and own 
could occur (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
According to Shleifer and Vishmy (1986) 
regarding the agency theory that the 
ownership structure quite influences the risk, 
the shareholders have a strong incentive and 
power to influence the company decision 
toward the risk because it would be equal with 
the diversification action. The hedging (value 
protecting) can solve the risk like currency risk 
(Arfaoui and Rejeb, 2015). Therefore, foreign 
ownership has a negative impact on the risk 
of the stock, we composed the hypothesis as 
follows:          
 
H2: Foreign ownership negatively affects 
risk of stock in Indonesia.        
 
We suggest that there is also an 
assumption which the better performance 
would attract the foreign investors to enter. It 
makes foreign investors want to obtain gain or 
profit. Liu Hsu (2014); Khanna and Palepu 
(1999) in Phung and Mishra (2015) stated that 
the ultimate goals of the shareholders are to 
maximize their wealth. If the stocks which they 
own having good performance, it would 
provide more massive potential gain than the 
stocks with poor performance. Vo (2015) 
added the disappearing of investment 
limitation among countries made the foreign 
investors easy to come. Grinbalt and 
Keloharju (2000), the foreign investors would 
buy the winner stocks and sell the loser stock, 
they tend to invest in the stocks with better 
performance. It is supported by Merton (1987) 
who stated that they tend to invest in the 
companies having the higher export ratio. The 
performance is also hypothesized influencing 
the foreign investors to invest, like FDI and 
joint venture (Ferguson, 2005). The 
Indonesian financial system in the industrial 
revolution 4.0 and globalization era also 
supports the foreign ownership to enter; the 
foreign investors highly own some stocks in 
Indonesia. Therefore, the performance may 
influence positively to the foreign ownership. 
We composed the hypothesis as follows:  
 
H3: Performance positively affects foreign 
ownership of stock in Indonesia. 
 
The lower risk could attract foreign 
investors to come because it provides a 
secure investment to them. If we see from the 
transaction cost theory, according to Hennart 
(1988), the organization will choose the 
governance structure with the lower cost, 
including the contract, and performance 
monitoring. If the risk is low, the company has 
good governance and the potential gain 
safely, so it attracts the foreign owners to 
enter.Further, according to the prospect 
theory ofKahneman and Tversky (1979) on 
the research about decision making.This 
theory sees the behavior when the risk 
occurs. This theory stated that the economic 
decision is a considered choice between 
benefit and loss, rather than the result, and 
the loss has a greater portion than the benefit 
despite the nominal value is equal. The lower 
risk means that the stock would be more 
interesting to own if it compared with the 
return stock with the same value but the 
weighted risk is higher. The risk would make 
the foreign investors afraid to enter even 
though the performance is equal or 
highersince the risk has a more significant 
portion than benefit. Therefore, the risk also 
may influence negatively toward the foreign 
ownership (two way hypothesizes), we draw 
the hypothesis as follows: 
H4: the risk negatively affects the foreign 
ownership of stock in Indonesia.       
 
METHODS 
. 
Data and samples 
 
We employed market-level analysis here, 
where it used the analysis on stock population 
from the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX),in 
particular, the monthly data from the 100 
Kompas Index between 2011-2017. The using 
from an Index is following some previous 
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researches like Li et al. (2011) who used the 
S&P Index. It helps us to sort more than 500 
stocks in the market since the index’s stocks 
have the advantage like the higher liquidity, 
massive market capitalization, and good 
fundamental performance. IDX legally 
launches the 100 Kompas Index in 
collaboration with Kompas Press on Friday, 
10
th
August 2007. The selected stocks for this 
index have high liquidity, significant 
capitalization, good fundamental and 
performance. Those stocks represent 
approximately 70-80% of the total stocks in 
Indonesia (IDR 1,582 Trillion). Therefore, the 
investor can attain the movement of all stocks 
from observing this index.      
We employed panel data (combination of 
time series and cross-section) according to 
Phung and Mishra (2015) who examined the 
ownership structure and performance. It 
depicts the influence of foreign ownership on 
the performance-risk across the time and the 
companies. We obtaineddata from some 
resources like 100 Kompas Index, Yahoo 
Finance, Custodian Central Depository Effect 
of Indonesia, Bloomberg, and Osiris. We used 
a purposive sampling approach; this helps us 
to take the samples based on specific criteria, 
where the selected stocks must provide these 
criteria: 1. Listed at IDX 2. Exist in the 100 
Kompas Index from 2011-2017 at least three 
times 3. The majority variables data are 
available (unbalanced data). Based on those 
criteria, we obtained 87 stocks in 7 years 
(approximately 609 observations).  
Operationalized variables 
 
The first variable is the foreign ownership, We 
follow (Chen, Zhian; Du, Jinmin; Li, Donghui; 
Ouyang 2003) Chen et al. (2013) to calculate 
foreign ownership as both dependent and 
independent variable from the sum of stocks 
owned by foreign at company itime t below:  
Foreign ownership 
 
Foreign =
 stock  owned  by  foreign i ,t
 total  shares  recorded i ,t
∗ 100% (a) 
The following variables are the key 
performance proxy; we used some variables, 
e.g. return on asset (ROA), return on equity 
(ROE). Then, we also measured the market 
performance of stocks by employing the 
dividend payout ratio (DPR), earning per 
shares (EPS), market-to-book (MTB), price to 
earnings ratio (PER) is the ratio which reflects 
a relative value of the firm’s stock om the 
market (Chen, Zhian; Du, Jinmin; Li, Donghui; 
Ouyang 2003), and the last is Tobin’s Q ratio. 
Those variables also can be dependent and 
independent variables in the models. The 
ROA is a ratio of net income divided by the 
total asset, ROA is commonly used for 
measuring the performance and efficiency like 
Khamis et al. (2015) and Chaganti and 
Damanpour (1991) who used ROA to 
measure the performance. According to 
McGuinness and Ferguson (2005). The 
company performance and foreign ownership 
up to present are affected by some factors, 
like return on asset (ROA), return on equity 
(ROE), earning per share (EPS), market-to-
book (MTB), and price to earnings ratio 
(PER). Mamatzakis et al. (2015), ROA is the 
ratio that can be a proxy for performance and 
efficiency.  The company performance can be 
captured with some indicators like Tobin’s Q, 
ROA, and ROE (Khamis et al. 2015). (Chen, 
Zhian; Du, Jinmin; Li, Donghui; Ouyang 2003) 
also used stock return which captures income 
to shareholders in the form of dividends and 
capital gains due to share price increases. 
 
ROAi,t  = 
net   income  after  tax  i,t
Total  asset  i,t
(b) 
ROAi,t = return on asset stock-i at the time-t 
 
The ROE is the ratio of net income after 
tax divided by the total equity, as like as ROA, 
ROE is used to measure the performance. 
The proxy for measuring the performance of 
the company is ROE according to Phung and 
Mishra (2015). Also, (Chen, Zhian; Du, 
Jinmin; Li, Donghui; Ouyang 2003) is one of 
the performance measures, it measures the 
efficiency which shareholders’ investment.  
 
ROEi,t  = 
net  income  after  tax  i,t 
Total  equity  i,t
(c) 
ROEi,t = return on equity stock-i at the time-t 
 
Then, the price to book value (PBV) is the 
ratio of the market price of the stock divided 
by the book value. According to Thomsen and 
Pederson (2000),this ratio can be used to 
measure the performance of the stock. The 
higher PBV reflects that the market 
appreciates higher the stock value rather than 
the book value. The other performance 
variables we did not state directly here, it 
would be explained in the further tables. 
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M/Bi,t  = 
market  price  of  stock  per  shares  i,t
book  value  of  stock  per  shares  i,t
(d)  
M/Bi,t = market to book ratio stock-i at the 
time-t 
 
Furthermore, we also measured the risk of 
stock by using some risk variables. They are 
thestandard deviation of ROA and ROE, and 
Z-score.  followsPhung and Mishra (2015). 
Control variables 
 
We also utilized some control variables in our 
models; those are selected as a control since 
they also have the potency to affect the 
performance and risk of the stock. They are 
size, leverage, age, and turnover. The size is 
the natural logarithm of market capitalization. 
It follows (Chen, Zhian; Du, Jinmin; Li, 
Donghui; Ouyang 2003) who used log 
transformation to account for skewness in the 
market capitalization distribution. Then 
leverage is the ratio of total debt divided by 
the total asset. Age is the year since the 
company established. The turnover is a ratio 
of stock trading frequency at the year t.  
 
 
 
An empirical model of hypotheses 
testing 
 
The model is regression analysis (ordinary 
least square), we used this model to examine 
the relationship between independent 
variables to the dependent variables. We also 
used some additional proxies to robust our 
testing results (with and without control 
models), and other robustness tests in the 
last. The regression analysis used Eviews 
10.0. The empirical model is adopted from Liu 
and Hsu (2014) to test the hypotheses 
composed as follows: 
Hypothesis 1 
Yperformancei,t = α + β1XFoi,t+ β2sizei,t + 
β3leveragei,t + β4 agei,t + β5 turnoveri,t + e 
 
Hypothesis 2 
Yriski,t  = α + β1XFOi,t+ β2sizei,t + β3leveragei,t 
+ β4 agei,t + β5 turnoveri,t + e 
 
Hypothesis 3 
YFOi,t = α + β1Xperformancei,t+ β2sizei,t + 
β3leveragei,t + β4 agei,t + β5 turnoveri,t + e 
 
Hypothesis 4 
YFOi,t = α + β1Xriski,t+ β2sizei,t + β3leveragei,t + 
β4 agei,t + β5 turnoveri,t + e 
 
Table 1. 
Descriptive statistics 
 
  FOi,t (%) ROAi,t ROEi,t SDROAi,t SDROEi,t Sizei,t (m) Agei,t Levi,t 
 Mean 0.22 6.81 13.05 1.82 5.14 28,391,305 34.97 1.51 
 Median 0.09 4.89 11.58 1.12 2.49 8,972,412 32.00 1.05 
 Maximum 0.97 50.79 160.99 45.81 62.27 401,000,000 106.00 14.81 
 Minimum 0.00 -33.69 -239.52 0.03 0.09 59,929 5.00 -11.44 
 Std. Dev. 0.27 9.28 25.54 2.96 8.32 53,519,158 16.80 2.07 
Skewness 0.98 1.31 -0.86 8.93 3.80 3.91 1.19 2.61 
 Kurtosis 2.64 7.55 30.13 117.19 19.58 20.12 5.42 19.57 
Jarque-Bera 79.48 555.61 14874.02 268815.10 6696.82 7,133 232.43 6076.49 
 Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Sum 106 3290.30 6305.51 876.81 2484.87 1.37E+10 16890.00 729.15 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 34.08 41538.60 314391.20 4223.29 33326.85 1.38E+18 136004.50 2069.23 
 Observations 483 483 483 483 483 483 483 483 
 
Note: FOi,tis the percentage of foreign ownership where it is counted by the number of stocks owned by the foreign investors divided 
by the total shares recorded on the stock itime t. ROAi,t is defined by the return on asset stock itime t, it is calculated by the natural 
logarithm of return on the asset the year itime t divided by the return on the asset the year t-1.ROEi,t is defined by the return on equity 
of stock itime t, it is calculated by the natural logarithm of return on equity the year itime t divided by the return on equity the year t-
1.SDROAi,t is defined by the standard deviation of return on asset stock itime t, it is calculated by the natural logarithm of return on the 
asset the year itime t divided by the return on the asset the year t-1.Sizei,t is measured by the market capitalization (in million). Agei,t is 
counted since the company established. leveragei,t is the ratio of total debt divided by the total asset.   
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
In this section, we present the descriptive 
statistic, regression analysis, and robustness 
tests. Table 1 depicts the descriptive statistic 
of data entailing the mean of foreign 
ownership (FO), return on asset (ROA), return 
on equity (ROE), standard deviation of return 
on asset (SDROA), and standard deviation of 
return on equity (SDROE) as follows: FO 
(22%), ROA (6.81), ROE (13.05), SDROA 
(1.82), size (28,391,305 million), age (34.97 
years), and leverage  (1.51). The other 
components in Table 1 are below: 
Then, Table 2 explains the correlation 
coefficient among variables including FO, 
ROA, ROE, SDROA, SDROE, size, leverage, 
and age. It helped to provide an earlier 
description of the correlation between 
variables before we conduct the regression 
analysis. This step also avoids the 
multicollinearity among independent variables. 
As presented in Table 2, no high correlation 
between variables, the correlation of FO to 
size is 0.23, while the correlation of FO to 
ROA and ROE are 0.11 and 0.11. The others 
like SDROA, SDROE, leverage, and age are 
below than 0.09. 
On Table 3 in particular Panel A, we start 
to regress the foreign ownership (FO) as an 
independent variable to the performance as 
dependent variable which is measured by the 
return on asset (ROA) and the return on 
equity (ROE). In the first column, foreign 
ownership has a positive relationship to the 
ROA without including the control variables by 
the coefficient 4.65 at 1% level. When we 
included the control variables in the second 
column, the foreign is not significant influence 
to the ROA (using ordinary least squares). We 
did robustness test using a different method, 
generalized least square (EGLS with fixed 
effect), that accommodates the classical 
assumptions of Gaus Markov matters like 
normality, autocorrelation, multicollinearity, 
and heteroscedasticity due to weighing the 
analysis. According to Wooldridge (2012), 
OLS is no longer the best linear unbiased 
estimator in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity; we used theGLS 
estimation. It leads to weighted least squares 
as a means of obtaining the BLUE estimator. 
The test statistics from the WLS estimation 
are either precisely valid when the error term 
is in the normal distribution or asymptotically 
valid under nonnormality. It assumes, of 
course, that we have the proper model of 
heteroscedasticity. 
The results in the Table 3 Panel A, the 
foreign ownership consistent contributes 
positively to the ROA. Furthermore, we 
conducted to analyze the relationship 
between foreign ownership and the return on 
equity. The foreign also has a positive 
relationship to the ROE. Nevertheless, the 
same result like ROA occurs when we run FO 
to ROE entailing the control variables. 
Surprisingly, when we used the EGLS-fixed-
effect method, the foreign negatively affect the 
ROE at 1% level. Overall, foreign ownership is 
vital to increase the asset performance. 
However, it reduced the equity performance of 
Table 2. 
Correlation coefficient 
 
  FOi,t ROAi,t ROEi,t SDROAi,t SDROEi,t Sizei,t Leveragei,t Agei,t 
FO 1.00 
       
ROA 0.10 1.00 
      
ROE 0.11 0.83 1.00 
     
SDROA 0.01 0.14 0.04 1.00 
    
SDROE 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.56 1.00 
   
Size 0.23 0.38 0.36 -0.07 -0.01 1.00 
  
Leverage 0.01 -0.17 -0.07 -0.12 0.05 -0.07 1.00 
 
Age 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.19 0.10 1.00 
 
Note: FOi,tis the percentage of foreign ownership where it is counted by the number of stocks owned by the foreign investors divided by 
the total shares recorded on the stock itime t. ROAi,t is defined by the return on asset stock itime t, it is calculated by the natural logarithm 
of return on the asset the year itime t divided by the return on the asset the year t-1.ROEi,t is defined by the return on equity of stock itime 
t, it is calculated by the natural logarithm of return on equity the year itime t divided by the return on equity the year t-1.SDROAi,t is defined 
by the standard deviation of return on asset stock itime t, it is calculated by the natural logarithm of return on the asset the year itime t 
divided by the return on the asset the year t-1.SDROEi,t is defined by the standard deviation of return on equity of stock itime t, it is 
calculated by the natural logarithm of return on equity in the year itime t divided by the return on the asset the year t-1.Sizei,t is measured 
by the market capitalization (in million). Agei,t is counted since the company established. leveragei,t is the ratio of total debt divided by the 
total asset.   
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stock significantly. According to Jensen and 
Mckeling (1976), whereas there is a conflict 
between foreign and domestic investor that 
can make an inefficiency, it will lead to poor 
stock performance. Nevertheless, when the 
performance is good, so the foreign 
ownership has an important role in increasing 
the performance. So, hypothesis 1 is 
confirmed.  
On the other hand, particularly Table 3 
Panel B, it attempts to see the relationship 
inversely. The performance (ROA and ROE 
as the independent variable), then the foreign 
as the dependent variable. Nevertheless, the 
relationship is not significant with or without 
the control variables. When we added the 
fixed effect and used the RLS and FMOLS, 
the ROA has a negative relationship 
significantly to the foreign ownership (quite 
small), while the ROE to the foreign is not 
significant consistently. In short, the 
performance does not affect foreign 
ownership. Therefore, we reject the 
hypothesis 2. Perhaps, the Indonesian stocks 
are little bit unfavorable to the foreigners, or 
they might suppose that the Indonesian 
stocks are the lesser. Grinbalt and Keloharju 
(2000) stated the foreign investors tended to 
buy winner stocks and sell loser shares. 
Foreign investors tended to invest in shares 
which are well performed. The other 
possibility is the foreign investors are afraid to 
invest in Indonesia like Agarwall et al. (2009) 
stated that foreign investors are risk-averse 
than domestic.
Table 3. 
Regression analysis of foreign ownership x (y) and performance y (x) 
 
Panel A. Y = fundamental performance proxies; X = Foreign Ownership (FO)  
 ROAi,t ROAi,t ROA (EGLS)i,t ROEi,t ROEi,t ROE (EGLS)i,t 
Const. 
5.27*** 
(0.59) 
-41.51*** 
(4.37) 
-28.82*** 
(2.22) 
10.61*** 
(2.77) 
-113.54*** 
(22.16) 
-60.44***  
(9.97) 
FO 
4.65*** 
(1.72) 
2.41 
(1.58) 
2.09*** 
(0.75) 
13.35* 
(8.06) 
7.64 
(8.01) 
-6.51*** 
(0.78) 
L.Size  
3.02*** 
(0.27) 
2.20*** 
(0.14) 
 
7.71*** 
(1.37) 
9.73*** 
(0.65) 
Leverage  
-0.16 
(0.14) 
-0.22** 
(0.09) 
 
-1.38 
(0.87) 
-0.71 
(0.47) 
Age  
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
 
0.11 
(0.13) 
-2.29*** 
(0.11) 
R-squared 0.01 0.21 0.36 0.01 0.08 0.83 
Prob. 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 
FE No No Yes No No Yes 
Obs. 525 510 510 512 497 497 
Panel B. Y = Foreign Ownership (FO); X = fundamental performance proxies 
 FOi,t FOi,t FO (EGLS)i,t FO (EGLS)i,t FO (RLS)i,t FO (FMOLS)i,t 
Const. 
0.20*** 
(0.01) 
-0.10 
(0.14) 
-0.05 
(0.10) 
0.22*** 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.10) 
 
ROA 
0.0025 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.0002 
(0.001) 
-0.001** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
 (0.001) 
-0.01** 
(0.005) 
ROE 
0.0001 
(0.0003) 
0.0001 
(0.0003) 
0.0002 
(0.0001) 
-0.0000001 
(0.0001) 
0.0003  
(0.0002) 
0.0005 
(0.001) 
L.Size  
0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.01* 
(0.01) 
0.01*** 
(0.004) 
0.01***  
(0.001) 
0.08***  
(0.03) 
Leverage  
0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Age  
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.0005) 
-0.01*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001** 
(0.001) 
-0.03*** 
(0.008) 
R-squared 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.95 0.01 0.67 
Prob. 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 
FE No No No Yes No No 
Obs. 512 497 497 497 497 346 
Note: FOi,tis the percentage of foreign ownership where it is counted by the number of stocks owned by the foreign investors divided 
by the total shares recorded on the stock itime t. ROAi,t is defined by the return on asset stock itime t, it is calculated by the natural 
logarithm of return on the asset the year itime t divided by the return on the asset the year t-1.ROEi,t is defined by the return on 
equity of stock itime t, it is calculated by the natural logarithm of return on equity the year itime t divided by the return on equity the 
year t-1.SDROAi,t is defined by the standard deviation of return on asset stock itime t, it is calculated by the natural logarithm of 
return on the asset the year itime t divided by the return on the asset the year t-1.Sizei,t is measured by the market capitalization (in 
million). Agei,t is counted since the company established. leveragei,t is the ratio of total debt divided by the total asset.  The 
regression is using ordinary least square in the first, second, fourth, and fifth columns at Panel A. The second, third, fifth, and sixth 
using EGLS. EGLS is one generalized least square methods which used cross sections weighted and also the fixed effect. Inthe 
Panel B, RLS is a robust least square technique that could robust the statistic. FMOLS is a panel fully modified least squares 
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Table 4. 
Regression analysis of foreign ownership x (y) and performance y (x) using different proxies 
 
Panel A. Dependent variables = fundamental performance proxies; Independent indicator: Foreign Ownership (FO)  
 Return Return Return (EGLS) EPS EPS EPS (EGLS) MTB MTB MTB (EGLS) PER PER Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q (EGLS) 
Const. 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.68*** 
(0.25) 
7.29*** 
(0.51) 
107.69*** 
(24.33) 
113.84** 
(44.94) 
238.23*** 
(22.18) 
2.32*** 
(0.78) 
-26.11*** 
(6.39) 
-25.78*** 
(1.86) 
38.23*** 
(5.09) 
99.84** 
(43.30) 
2.08***  
(0.72) 
-9.85*** 
(0.97) 
-6.40*** 
(0.36) 
FO 
-0.14 
(0.09) 
-0.08 
(0.25) 
-0.15* 
(0.08) 
316.21*** 
(71.28) 
226.41*** 
(71.30) 
-12.38 
(8.02) 
6.10*** 
(2.29) 
4.81** 
(2.32) 
-1.18*** 
(0.28) 
-19.16 
(14.60 
-14.52 
(14.92) 
-0.04 
(2.11) 
1.00*** 
(0.35) 
-0.29*** 
(0.06) 
L.Size  
-0.05*** 
(0.25) 
-0.47*** 
(0.03) 
 
0.000002*** 
(0.00) 
0.00002*** 
(0.00) 
 
1.74*** 
(0.40) 
2.53*** 
(0.12) 
 
-2.40 
(2.68) 
 
0.67*** 
(0.06) 
0.75*** 
(0.02) 
Leverage  
0.02* 
(0.09) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
 
-6.64 
(6.25) 
1.20 
(1.13) 
 -0.41 
-0.62*** 
(0.07) 
 
-4.28** 
(1.69) 
 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
Age  
0.001 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
 
-1.08 
(1.10) 
-3.14*** 
(0.65) 
 0.04 
-0.28*** 
(0.02) 
 
-0.50* 
(0.26) 
 
0.01** 
(0.01) 
-0.11*** 
(0.00) 
R-squared 0.00 0.03 0.46 0.04 0.12 0.92 0.01 0.06 0.89 0.003 0.03 0.00 0.24 0.93 
Prob. 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.01 0.98 0.00 0.00 
FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No No No Yes 
Obs. 529 510 510 528 514 514 528 514 524 446 437 528 514 514 
Panel B. Dependent variable = Foreign Ownership (FO); Independent indicators: fundamental performance proxies 
 FO FO FO (EGLS) FO FO FO (EGLS) FO FO FO (EGLS) FO FO FO FO FO 
Const. 
0.22*** 
(0.01) 
0.14 
(0.12) 
0.29 
(0.07) 
0.20*** 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.13) 
0.25*** 
(0.05) 
0.21*** 
(0.01) 
-0.11 
(0.12) 
0.24*** 
(0.05) 
0.23*** 
(0.01) 
-0.13 
(0.14) 
0.22*** 
(0.01) 
0.001 
(0.13) 
0.18*** 
(0.05) 
Return 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.003 
(0.01) 
           
EPS    
0.0001*** 
(0.00) 
0.0001*** 
(0.00) 
0.00001 
(0.00) 
        
MTB       
0.002*** 
(0.008) 
0.001** 
(0.0008) 
0.0002 
(0.0006) 
     
PER          
-0.0002 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
   
Tobin’s Q            
-0.00001 
(0.0009) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
-0.00002 
(0.001) 
L.Size  
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.01*** 
(0.003) 
 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02*** 
(0.004) 
Leverage  
0.002 
(0.00) 
0.002 
(0.00) 
 
0.002 
(0.00) 
-0.0008 
(0.00) 
 
0.002 
(0.03) 
-0.0008 
(0.001) 
 
-0.01 
(0.001) 
 
0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Age  
0.001 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
 
0.0007 
(0.00) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
 
0.0006 
(0.0006) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
 
0.001** 
(0.0008) 
 
0.0004 
(0.0006) 
-0.01*** 
(0.001) 
R-squared 0.004 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.96 0.01 0.03 0.96 0.003 0.03 0.000001 0.03 0.96 
Prob. 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.0001 0.00 0.008 0.01 0.00 0.19 0.02 0.98 0.001 0.00 
Fixed effect No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No No No Yes 
Obs. 529 510 510 528 514 514 528 514 514 446 437 528 514 514 
Note: FOi,tis the percentage of foreign ownership where it is counted by the number of stocks owned by the foreign investors divided by the total shares recorded on the stock itime t. returni,t is defined 
by the natural logarithm of price t divided by the price at the time t-1. EPSi,t is the earning per share, it is calculated by the net income divided by a number of outstanding stocks. MTBi,t is a ratio that is 
calculated from the market capitalization divided by the total book value. PERi,t the stock price is divided by the earnings per shares. Tobin’s Qi,t. is the total market value of the firm divided by the total 
asset value. Sizei,t is measured by the market capitalization (in million). leveragei,t is the ratio of total debt divided by total asset.  Agei,t is counted since the company established. EGLS is one 
generalized least square methods which used cross sections weighted and also the fixed effect.
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Furthermore, we reanalyze the result by 
utilizing the different proxies of performance 
that is the market performance of the stocks 
as presented in Table 4. We used the return, 
earnings per shares (EPS), market-to-book 
(MTB), price to earnings ratio (PER), and 
Tobin’s Q.   In Table 4 at Panel A, the 
independent variable is foreign ownership, 
and the dependent variable is the 
performance proxies. As presented, the FO 
has a negative relationship significantly return, 
MTB, and Tobin’s Q   by using EGLS cross 
sections weighted and fixed effect. 
Nevertheless, the FO has a positive 
relationship to EPS, MTB, and Tobin’s Q 
using the ordinary least square method with 
and withoutthe controls except to the return 
(with and without control), PER (with and 
without control), and Tobin’s Q (without 
control).   
We prefer to use EGLS as a reference, by 
virtue of the possible bias matter in the 
ordinary least square. The generalized least 
square accommodates it and the results are 
more valid. Shortly, the foreign ownership 
decreased the return, market-to-book, and 
Tobin’s Q, but it increased the earning per 
shares. Hypothesis 1 is supported, albeit the 
impact of foreign ownership mostly negative 
on the performance of the stock in the market. 
Regarding the stock performance in the 
capital market, the foreign ownership may 
increase the conflict (agency) in the company 
based on the agency theory (Jensen and 
Mckeling, 1976), conflict from the foreign to 
the manager and the domestic investors, it 
Table 5. 
Regression analysis of foreign ownership x (y) and risk y (x) 
 
Panel A. Y = fundamental performance proxies; X = Foreign Ownership (FO)   
 SDROAi,t SDROAi,t SDROA (EGLS)i,t SDROEi,t SDROEi,t SDROE (EGLS)i,t  
Const. 2.07*** 
(0.21) 
5.66 
(1.76) 
4.32*** 
(1.05) 
4.76*** 
(0.47) 
9.19** 
(4.02) 
7.58*** 
(2.17) 
 
FOi,t -0.06 
(0.62) 
0.19 
(0.63) 
0.27* 
(0.15) 
1.21 
(1.37) 
1.59 
(1.43) 
0.52 
(0.35) 
 
L.Sizei,t  -0.27 
(0.11) 
-0.06 
(0.07) 
 -0.32 
(0.25) 
-0.13 
(0.15) 
 
Leveragei,t  -0.23 
(0.06) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
 0.16 
(0.19) 
-0.64*** 
(0.17) 
 
Agei,t  0.03 
(0.01) 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
 0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
 
R-squared 0.00001 0.05 0.60 0.001 0.01 0.80  
Prob. 0.93 0.04 0.00 0.38 0.40 0.00  
Fixed effect No No No No No Yes  
Obs. 522 503 503 504 486 486  
Panel B. Y = Foreign Ownership (FO); X: fundamental performance proxies  
 FOi,t FOi,t FO (EGLS)i,t FOi,t FOi,t FO (EGLS)i,t  
Const. 0.22*** 
(0.01) 
-0.20 
(0.13) 
0.25*** 
(0.06) 
0.22 
(0.01) 
-0.19 
(0.13) 
0.21*** 
(0.05) 
 
SDROAi,t -0.002 
(0.003) 
0.0009 
(0.003) 
-0.0001 
(0.001)    
 
SDROEi,t 
   
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.00 
-0.0001 
(0.0003) 
 
L.Sizei,t  0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.01*** 
(0.004)  
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.01** 
(0.004) 
 
Leveragei,t  0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.001)  
0.003 
(0.01) 
-0.0005 
(0.001) 
 
Agei,t  0.001 
(0.0007) 
-0.01*** 
(0.001)  
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
 
R-squared 0.0001 0.02 0.96 0.001 0.02 0.97  
Prob. 0.93 0.02 0.00 0.38 0.02 0.00  
Fixed effect No No Yes No No Yes  
Obs. 522 503 503 504 486 486  
Note: FOi,tis the percentage of foreign ownership where it is counted by the number of stocks owned by the foreign investors divided by 
the total shares recorded on the stock itime t.SDROAi,t is defined by the standard deviation of return on asset stock itime t, it is 
calculated by the natural logarithm of return on the asset the year itime t divided by the return on the asset the year t-1.SDROEi,t is 
defined by the standard deviation of return on equity of stock itime t, it is calculated by the natural logarithm of return on equity in the 
year itime t divided by the return on the asset the year t-1. LSizei,t is measured by the market capitalization that has been normalized 
using the natural logarithm (in million). leveragei,t is the ratio on total debt divided by total asset.  Agei,t is counted since the company 
established. EGLS is one generalized least square methods which used cross sections weighted and also the fixed effect. 
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leads the poor performance. It confirmed that 
we support the hypothesis. In the Panel B 
Table 4, the independent variables are the 
performance proxies, and the dependent 
variable is the foreign ownership. By using 
OLS, the earning per shares, market-to-book, 
and the Tobin’s Q have the positive 
relationship to foreign ownership.  When we 
compared by using EGLS method (cross 
section weight and fixed effect), no 
performanceproxies which influence the 
foreign ownership. Then, when we exclude 
the controls variable, there is also no 
performance proxies affect the foreign to enter 
except the EPS and PER. To summarize, the 
market performance proxies not significantly 
affect the percentage of foreign ownership. 
Nonetheless, foreign ownership affects the 
market performance of the stock. It rejected 
that hypothesis 3 (performance has the 
effectof attracting the foreign). Shapiro (2006) 
stated the foreign investors who want to invest 
in another country would face some risks like 
currency, asymmetricliquidity information, 
regulation, and the different market time. So, 
they commonly did not invest in Indonesia. 
Azar (2010) added the risk that the foreign 
investors would face not only the stock risk 
but also the currency risk.   
 In the next step, we attempted to analyze 
the relationship between foreign ownership to 
the risk of the stock.  Firstly, we used some 
proxies to measure the risk like the standard 
deviation of return on asset (SDROA) and the 
standard deviation of return on equity 
(SDROE). InTable 5 especially in Panel A, the 
independent variable is foreign ownership, 
while the dependent variable is the risk. The 
analysis presents that foreign ownership only 
affects the risk of the assetpositively 
significant (using EGLS), preferably to the risk 
of equity is not significant. 
To sum up, the higher foreign ownership, 
the more considerable risk of the asset. It 
Table 6. 
Regression analysis of foreign ownership x (y) and risk y (x) using different proxies 
 
Panel A. Dependent variables = fundamental risk proxies; Independent indicator: Foreign Ownership (FO) 
 DPRi,t DPRi,t DPR (EGLS)i,t Z Scorei,t Z Scorei,t Z Score (EGLS)i,t 
Const. 13.49*** 
(1.84) 
-67.33*** 
(15.03) 
16.99*** 
(3.99) 
2.15*** 
(0.10) 
-3.37*** 
(0.76) 
1.87*** 
(0.47) 
FOi,t 5.43 
(5.33) 
1.96 
(5.44) 
0.45 
(1.30) 
0.52** 
(0.28) 
0.25 
(0.27) 
0.03 
(0.08) 
L.Sizei,t  5.30 
(0.93)*** 
0.31 
(0.25) 
 0.37*** 
(0.05) 
0.23*** 
(0.03) 
Leveragei,t  -0.13 
(0.50) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
 -0.04* 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
Agei,t  -0.09 
(0.09) 
-0.20* 
(0.10) 
 -0.01 
(0.004) 
-0.09*** 
(0.01) 
R-squared 0.001 0.06 0.62 0.01 0.13 0.97 
Prob. 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 
Fixed effect No No Yes No No Yes 
Obs. 529 509 509 519 503 503 
Panel B. Dependent variable = Foreign Ownership (FO); Independent indicators: risk proxies 
 FOi,t FOi,t FO (EGLS)i,t FOi,t FOi,t FO (EGLS)i,t 
Const. 0.22*** 
(0.01) 
-0.14 
(0.13) 
0.25*** 
(0.05) 
0.19*** 
(0.02) 
-0.12 
(0.13) 
0.23 
(0.05) 
DPRi,t 0.0003 
(0.0003) 
0.0001 
(0.0004) 
-0.00003 
(0.00009)    
Z Scorei,t 
   
0.01* 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
L.Sizei,t  
0.02 0.01  
0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.01*** 
(0.004) 
Leveragei,t  
0.001 -0.0005  
0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.0004 
(0.001) 
Agei,t  
0.0008 -0.01  
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
R-squared 0.001 0.02 0.96 0.01 0.02 0.96 
Prob. 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.00 
Fixed effect No No Yes No No Yes 
Obs. 529 509 509 519 503 503 
 
Note: DPRi,t is the dividend payout ratio, it is calculated by the percentage of dividend paid from the net income. Z Scorei,t is the bankruptcy 
indicators from Altman.   FOi,tis the percentage of foreign ownership where it is counted by the number of stocks owned by the foreign 
investors divided by the total shares recorded on the stock itime t.LSizei,t is measured by the market capitalization that has been normalized 
using the natural logarithm (in million). leveragei,t is the ratio on total debt divided by total asset.  Agei,t is counted since the company 
established. EGLS is one generalized least square methods which used cross sections weighted and also the fixed effect 
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confirmed the hypothesis 2 where foreign 
ownership affects the risk of the stock. Wang 
(2007) proved that foreign ownership 
negativelyaffects the company because the 
stocks owned by the foreign not evidently the 
risk would be lower. Instead, the risk would be 
more significant. In the agency theory (Jensen 
and Mckeling, 1976), the agency problem and 
conflict between foreign shareholders and 
manager may arise. That conflict leads the 
inefficiency and influences the policy or 
decision taking in the corporation. Overall, 
those lead to the company performance 
becoming worse. Then on the Panel B, both 
SDROA and SDROE do not affect the 
percentage of foreign ownership. So, the risk 
of asset and equity do not affect significantly 
to the foreign ownership. It rejected 
hypothesis 4 where the risk effects the foreign 
ownership. Some found that there is no 
interaction between foreign ownership to the 
stock’s performance and risk. It is explained 
by the company’s decision which is mostly 
decided by the majority shareholders, in this 
case, the foreign owners as the minority 
shareholders. Therefore, the foreign has no 
role in that decision (Bekaert and Harvey, 
1997; De Santis and Imrohoroglu, 1994; Kim 
and Singal, 2000). The assumption that the 
higher or lower risk affect the foreign to own 
or avoid that stock is not occurred.  
To confirm our result, we reanalyzed the 
relationship between foreign ownership and 
Our study limits the samples only in Indonesia 
and excludes the financial company. 
Furthermore, for future research, we 
recommend enhancing the robustness tests 
like adding the percentile, splitting samples 
into high and low foreign ownership, and 
improving the alternative risk measurements. 
We also recommend enlarging the year of 
observations, in particular, until the crisis 
period. Therefore, we could obtain the 
different role of foreign ownership to the 
performance and risk during the crisis. The 
big data analysis like enlarging the samples 
across the countries, so we could attain the 
global role of the foreign. It is difficult, but it 
would contribute significant impact to the 
world.       
the risk of stock using different proxies. We 
utilized the dividend payout ratio (DPR) and 
the Z Score from Altzman. In Table 6, the 
Panel A depicts that the foreign ownership 
does not influence significantly to the risk 
proxies. It rejected the hypothesis 2 where FO 
effects performance and risk is not significant, 
Albeit, it affects significantly at 5% level to the 
Z score. Nevertheless, we exclude the control 
variables and use the OLS method. 
Therefore, it may contain bias matter. We 
firmly believe that the GLS results are more 
valid. Some found that there is no interaction 
between foreign ownership to the stock’s 
performance and risk. It explained that the 
company’s decision is largely decided by the 
majority shareholders, in this case, the foreign 
owners as the minority shareholders. 
Therefore, the foreign has no role in that 
decision (Bekaert and Harvey, 1997; De 
Santis and Imrohoroglu, 1994; Kim and 
Singal, 2000).      
Then, on the Panel B. Overall, the results 
are like the Panel A that there is no effect of 
the risk toward the foreign ownership 
percentage. We rejected the hypothesis 4 
where the risk effects the foreign ownership. 
Bekaert and Harvey (1997), De Santis and 
Imrohoroglu (1994), Kim and Singal (2000) 
stated that there is no interaction between 
foreign ownership andstock risk.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We found that foreign ownership contributes 
positively to some performance indicators, 
while they also contribute positively to the 
foreign without control variables. This 
relationship would be lower when we use 
some control variables. On the other hand, 
the relationship between foreign and risk are 
mostly insignificant, only foreign to z score are 
significant. The risk also not influences the 
foreign ownership of the stock. 
In conclusion, foreign ownership has an 
essential role to improve the performance of 
the stock and vice versa. Therefore, we 
should not limit foreign ownership in 
Indonesia. Due to the benefits like the 
improvement of performance from its role. 
The foreign ownership contributes to the 
company like the better governance, control, 
technology transfer. Therefore, the 
performance would increase. The inverse 
relationship such the performance affects the 
foreign to enter does not occur.  
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